Major Hajj related accidents in Saudi Arabia

Every year, millions of Muslims converge on the Saudi holy cities of Mecca and Medina for the annual hajj pilgrimage, with the massive ceremonies representing a major security and logistical challenge for the kingdom's authorities.

On occasion, the hajj and events surrounding it have been marred by accidents and tragedies, such as Thursday's stampede near Mecca that killed at least 453 people.

Here's a look at some deadly hajj-related incidents:

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2015: At least 453 people are killed and hundreds injured in a stampede in Mina, on the outskirts of the holy city of Mecca. In the lead-up to hajj, 111 people are killed and nearly 400 injured when a crane collapses in bad weather, crashing onto the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam's holiest site.

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2006: More than 360 pilgrims are killed in a stampede at the desert plain of Mina, near Mecca, where pilgrims carry out a symbolic stoning of the devil by throwing pebbles against three stone walls. The day before the hajj began, an eight-story building being used as a hostel near the Grand Mosque in Mecca collapsed, killing at least 73 people.

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2004: A crush of pilgrims at Mina kills 244 pilgrims and injures hundreds on the final day of the hajj ceremonies.

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2001: A stampede at Mina during the final day of the pilgrimage ceremonies kills 35 hajj pilgrims.

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1998: About 180 pilgrims are trampled to death in panic after several of them fell off an overpass during the final stoning ritual at Mina.

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1997: At least 340 pilgrims are killed in a fire at the tent city of Mina as the blaze was aided by high winds. More than 1,500 were injured.

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1994: Some 270 pilgrims are killed in a stampede during the stoning ritual at Mina.

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1990: The worst hajj-related tragedy claims the lives of 1,426 pilgrims in a stampede in an overcrowded pedestrian tunnel leading to holy sites in Mecca.

AL-QA`IDA PLAYS A LONG GAME IN SYRIA

Abstract: Since its public emergence in Syria in January 2012, the al-Qa`ida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has consistently sought to balance its transnational jihadist ideology and objectives with pragmatic efforts to integrate and embed itself within revolutionary dynamics. Maintaining this delicate balance has not been easy, but having succeeded to date, Jabhat al-Nusra is currently one of the most powerful and influential armed actors in Syria. Ultimately, however, the group is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. It aims to establish durable roots in an unstable environment from which al-Qa`ida’s transnational ambitions may one day be launched.

Al-Qa`ida’s role in Syria has evolved considerably since its humble beginnings as a wing of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in mid-to-late 2011. Formally established by seven prominent Islamists in October 2011 after four months of secret meetings,[1] Jabhat al-Nusra did not publicly emerge until January 23, 2012.[2] In its first six months of publicly acknowledged operations, Jabhat al-Nusra was deeply unpopular within Syria’s rapidly expanding insurgency. Although it had not admitted its links to the ISI or al-Qa`ida, its rhetoric, imagery, and tactics made its international jihadist links clear. A revolutionary opposition, still clinging to nationalist ideals, feared what appeared to be ISI-like terrorist cells emerging within its midst.

By fall 2012, however, Jabhat al-Nusra had evolved from a terrorist organization into an expanding insurgent movement. Its forces had begun integrating into the broader armed opposition, especially in Syria’s largest city, Aleppo. By December 11, 2012, when the U.S. government designated it an alias of al-Qa`ida in Iraq, and a terrorist organization,[3] Jabhat al-Nusra was operating as a fully fledged, de facto opposition actor, albeit on an extreme end of the ideological spectrum.

Two-and-a-half years later, aided in particular by the protracted Syrian conflict and the brutal rise of the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra is one of the most powerful armed groups in Syria. Its consistent balancing of ideologically driven jihadist objectives with local sensitivities and revolutionary ideals has placed Jabhat al-Nusra in an advantageous position. Rarely will any Syrian opposition group commit genuinely to both denouncing the role of Jabhat al-Nusra in the conflict and permanently ceasing battlefield cooperation with it.[4]

Jabhat al-Nusra remains an al-Qa`ida affiliate, however, and it has occasionally displayed the fundamentalist behavior one would ordinarily expect. From sectarian killings[5] to harsh legal restrictions and executions,[6] the true and extremist nature of Jabhat al-Nusra has periodically been revealed.

Throughout its existence, Jabhat al-Nusra and its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, have generally maintained the group’s jihadist credibility while making its stance within the complex conflict as accommodating as possible. In so doing, al-Qa`ida has played a strategic long game in Syria, which has allowed it to establish a new stronghold on Israel’s border and in sight of Europe.

Social Roots and Integration 
The key to al-Qa`ida’s longevity in Syria has been its integration into the broader armed opposition and its establishment of durable roots in liberated communities.

Militarily, Jabhat al-Nusra has sought to maintain pragmatic alliances with many armed groups, most of which have no interest in international jihad. While public acknowledgment of relations with the most moderate Syrian rebel factions has steadily declined, their forces nonetheless coordinate either within theater-specific operations rooms or indirectly through more Syria-focused Islamist groups. This sustains the group’s revolutionary legitimacy, but Jabhat al-Nusra has also sought to underline its jihadist credibility by nurturing bonds with factions that incorporate a more extremist transnational outlook. Since fighting with the Islamic State started in early 2014, these alliances have centered on movements with some level of implicit fealty to al-Qa`ida.[a]

These two poles of operational collaboration have been held together by Jabhat al-Nusra’s investment in relationships with conservative Syrian Islamist factions such as Ahrar al-Sham. This particular alliance has formed the existential glue for al-Qa`ida and its place within the broader Syrian conflict.[7]

Jabhat al-Nusra’s role within the Jaish al-Fateh coalition in Idlib is an effective example of this dynamic. Formed in late March 2015 after three months of negotiations, Jaish al-Fateh contains six other groups, including Ahrar al-Sham, which all strictly limit their objectives to Syria, explicitly reject links to international jihad, and represent the broader Syrian Islamist portion of the insurgency.[b] For Jabhat al-Nusra, membership has ensured it coordinates officially with local Syrian Islamists; unofficially with moderate nationalist and often Western-backed factions outside the coalition; and also directly with smaller, transnationally minded jihadist units.[c]

After four years in Syria, the role of Jabhat al-Nusra in the Jaish al-Fateh coalition represents the apogee of al-Qa`ida’s willingness to accommodate Syria’s revolutionary dynamics. Sizeable components devoted to civil, political, and judicial matters, plus a less-talked-about humanitarian relief wing, make Jaish al-Fateh more than a military operations room or yet another temporary alliance.

Previously, Jabhat al-Nusra had pointedly refused to join such broader opposition bodies, so why the apparent change in policy? The Jaish al-Fateh concept remains limited to specific provincial theaters and is focused on defeating the regime and introducing an alternative model of civil governance. Geographical limitations allow Jabhat al-Nusra to selectively choose to join bodies where its interests are best served by doing so, Idlib being a case in point, as it is the group’s principal stronghold.

Syria as a “Safe Base”
In September 2013, al-Qa`ida’s al-Sahab Media published Ayman al-Zawahiri’s “General Guidelines for Jihad.”[8] In line with his long-held belief that acquiring allies through pragmatic moderation was the most viable path toward sparking mass revolution,[9] al-Zawahiri’s document focused on affiliate self-discipline and restraint. Al-Qa`ida factions were advised to “focus on spreading awareness among the general public” and more broadly to invest in “maslaha (securing interests) and mafsadah (averting harm).” Fighters were ordered to refrain from fighting those “who have not raised arms against us” and to cease attacking targets where Muslim civilians may be harmed. Perhaps most surprisingly and clearly differentiating it from the Islamic State, al-Qa`ida units were to “avoid fighting the deviant sects” (Shia, Alawites, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Sufis) and to “avoid meddling with Christian, Sikh and Hindu communities…[as] we are keen to live with them in a peaceful manner.”

These bold declarations reflected changing conditions and al-Qa`ida needed to demonstrate some adaptation. The Islamic State was seeking to escalate its brutality in Iraq and (from April 2013) Syria in order to exacerbate existing revolutions and to encourage new ones, but al-Qa`ida sought to grow durable roots within already unstable environments. Al-Zawahiri’s guidelines made it clear that al-Qa`ida’s “struggle is a long one, and jihad is in need of safe bases.”[10]

The publication of al-Qa`ida’s guidelines came as the central leadership was increasingly isolated from its international affiliates. Meanwhile, Jabhat al-Nusra was flourishing and was already implementing much of al-Zawahiri’s directives. However, despite Jabhat al-Nusra’s apparent pragmatism, it remained a self-identified al-Qa`ida affiliate and its transnational vision still existed, at least within its leadership, its foreign fighter contingent, and some of its Syrian rank and file. Moreover, amid the restraint, the guidelines were explicit that “all Mujahid brothers must consider targeting the interests of the Western Zionist Crusader alliance in any part of the world as their foremost duty.”[11]

Consequently, Jabhat al-Nusra was effectively implementing al-Qa`ida’s long-game strategy with the objective of gradually developing a safe base in Syria. This required the delicate balancing of pragmatic short-term interests with a sustained focus on long-term jihadist objectives. And with the jihadi goal fundamentally contradicting the ideals of the Syrian revolution, achieving it slowly and tactfully was critically important. Ultimately, it has taken Jabhat al-Nusra four years to build its power and develop as a preeminent actor in Syria’s conflict.

The true extent of al-Qa`ida’s ambitions in Syria, however, was made publicly clear with the leak of an audio recording on July 11, 2014. In it al-Julani is heard declaring that “the time has come…for us to establish an Islamic Emirate in al-Sham…without compromise, complacency, equivocation, or circumvention.”[12] [13] The speech caused concern across the Syrian opposition, many members of which had consistently maintained that they had no issue with Jabhat al-Nusra so long as it did not impose foreign objectives. An Islamic emirate represented just that.

Twenty-four hours later, Jabhat al-Nusra released a statement admitting:

“We in Jabhat al-Nusra strive to establish an Islamic emirate…[but] we have not yet announced the establishment of an emirate. When the time comes, and the sincere mujahideen and the pious scholars agree with our stance, we will announce this emirate, by the will of Allah.” [14]

Coming amid the fallout from the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate, the July 11 audio recording looked to have been purposefully released.[d] To preserve its jihadist credibility, al-Qa`ida had been forced to show its hand in Syria and hope that years of relationship building could redeem it. Fortunately for Jabhat al-Nusra, the urgency of the fight against the Assad regime and the Islamic State, and its delicate half step back ensured it remained an accepted player for the time being.

Nonetheless, Jabhat al-Nusra’s long-term intentions had been revealed, and when U.S. aircraft in September 2014 targeted al-Qa`ida fighters purportedly plotting external attacks from Syria,[15] al-Qa`ida’s long game was also exposed.

Syria as Launching Pad
Beginning in early 2013, experienced al-Qa`ida figures began traveling to Syria in what appeared to be a centrally directed move by the core leadership. There were rumors al-Zawahiri had ordered an evacuation.[16] Early arrivals included two Saudi nationals: Abdulrahman Mohammed al-Jahani, a former member of al-Qa`ida’s Shura Council who came from Pakistan,[17] and Abdelmohsen Abdullah al-Sharikh, who had been al-Qa`ida’s operational chief in Iran.[18] Later arrivals included former Algerian army officer and al-Qa`ida veteran Said Arif who escaped from France in October 2013,[19] and Kuwaiti former Iran chief Mohsen al-Fadhli. Other prominent members included Abu Yusuf al-Turki,[20] Abu Layth al-Yemeni,[21] and the French citizen David Drugeon.[22]

The first major benefit of these arrivals was the consolidation of operational relations with Lebanon-based, al-Qa`ida-linked Kataib Abdullah Azzam. Al-Sharikh (better known as Sanafi al-Nasr—See Kévin Jackson, “From Khorasan to the Levant: A Profile of Sanafi al-Nasr” in this issue, p. 24) was close to Kataib Abdullah Azzam’s former leader Saleh al-Qaraawi and then-leader Majid bin Mohammed al-Majid and was instrumental in forming the bonds that led to Jabhat al-Nusra’s bombings—some coordinated with Kataib Abdullah Azzam—in Lebanon in early 2014.[23] However, in addition to moving Jabhat al-Nusra closer in character to al-Qa`ida, the real strategic significance was the low-level initiation of planning for external attacks, some allegedly in concert with expert bomb-makers based in Yemen. The first public recognition of this came in early July 2014, when security at airports with direct service to the United States was tightened due to “credible threats.”[24] It was not until September 13, 2014, however, that U.S. officials publicly started using the term “Khorasan Group.”[25] Although some well-connected Syrian Islamists had spoken about a secretive “Wolves” unit,[26] little was known about the cell led by al-Fadhli. Seven days later, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper publicly declared that “Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as the Islamic State,”[27] and on September 23, U.S. missiles were launched.

At least 50 Jabhat al-Nusra militants were reported killed when the first U.S. missiles struck targets in northern Syria. Days later, Abu Firas al-Suri and al-Julani issued veiled threats of potential retaliation if strikes continued, with al-Julani stating:

“This is what will take the battle to the heart of your land…Muslims will not watch while their sons are bombed. Your leaders will not be the only ones who would pay the price of the war. You will pay the heaviest price.”[28]

Jabhat al-Nusra had so successfully embedded itself into the Syrian opposition and shown itself so dedicated to defeating the Assad regime that the U.S. strikes were immediately perceived by many Syrians as counter-revolutionary. Moreover, vetted Free Syrian Army groups soon questioned the value of being seen as U.S.-aligned.[29] Integration had served its purpose as a protective blanket from the consequences of Jabhat al-Nusra’s long-term transnational ambitions.

A secret letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Julani in early 2015 purportedly contained an instruction to cease foreign plotting.[30] Although al-Julani himself appeared to confirm this during his two-part interview with Al Jazeera Arabic (on May 27 and June 3), U.S. airstrikes have continued to target the Khorasan Group in parts of northern Idlib and Aleppo. Most prominently, al-Fadhli was killed in one such strike on July 8.

Internal Change
While maintaining its prominent role in a seemingly intractable and brutal civil war, Jabhat al-Nusra has undergone a process of internal reorientation. Since mid-2014, the group has struggled to define its identity amid changing circumstances. The Islamic State’s rise posed an existential challenge to al-Qa`ida, which prompted a shift in Jabhat al-Nusra’s top leadership, with the more pragmatic Maysar Ali Musa Abdullah al-Juburi (Abu Mariya al-Qahtani) being replaced by Jordanian hardliner Dr. Sami al-Oraydi. Other prominent al-Qa`ida veterans, such as Abu Hammam al-Suri and Abu Firas al-Suri, were given a public spotlight, while more secretive figures previously active in Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan began emerging from the shadows. Jabhat al-Nusra’s attention shifted to centers such as Idlib and to some extent Aleppo, where it began countering and defeating rebel groups supported by the United States.[e]

While this shift toward a more aggressive posture may have benefited Jabhat al-Nusra’s immediate interests, it began to erode the broader trust its previous pragmatism had earned. Internal dissent emerged, including among mid-level Syrian commanders and two founding members, Abu Mariya al-Qahtani and Saleh al-Hamawi. The arrival of al-Zawahiri’s secret letter in early 2015 appeared to lay the issue to rest, at least temporarily. It ordered the group to cease plotting attacks against the West; to better integrate with the revolution and its people; to coordinate more broadly with opposition factions; and to work toward a Sharia-based judicial structure.[31] Shortly thereafter, Jaish al-Fateh was formed and Jabhat al-Nusra’s belligerence declined significantly.

Only recently has this balance again shifted back toward jihadist fundamentalism. Jabhat al-Nusra’s re-moderation in early 2015 appears to have engendered significant divisions within the group’s senior leadership. Perhaps Jabhat al-Nusra’s sustained success in Syria has also contributed toward a proliferation in opinions and a divergence in strategic outlooks. Similarly, the addition of an external threat—in the form of continued U.S. strikes—will have emboldened those with stronger transnational ambitions.

While some of those labeled as Khorasan operatives abided by al-Zawahiri’s instructions in early 2015 and re-integrated into Jabhat al-Nusra’s Syria-focused insurgent structure, others have isolated themselves and allegedly continue plotting semi-independently. It is feasible that some established links to members of other northern Syria-based jihadist factions, such as Jund al-Aqsa. At some point after his arrival, Said Arif left Jabhat al-Nusra to become Jund al-Aqsa’s military chief, but was reportedly killed in an alleged U.S. airstrike on May 20.[32] [f]

Internal dissent within Jabhat al-Nusra—some of it public—has also increased. After months of opposition to Jabhat al-Nusra’s posture toward other rebels, Saleh al-Hamawi was finally expelled in mid-July.[33] With Abu Mariya al-Qahtani isolated, several other moderate dissenters are reportedly clinging on at the ideological periphery, while reports of expulsions and defections continue to emerge.[g]

Clearly, Jabhat al-Nusra has begun to identify more overtly with al-Qa`ida. While Jabhat al-Nusra fighters have been seen carrying flags emblazoned with Tanzim Qa`idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Sham (al-Qa`ida organization in the Levant) for nearly two years, the overt adoption of such identification is now the norm. In late June 2015, the group also released “The Heirs of Glory,” a high-quality, 43-minute documentary featuring footage of the 9/11 attacks and threats made by Bin Ladin.[34]

Al-Julani’s Al Jazeera interviews also underlined that despite the internal discussion about the group’s continued affiliation with al-Qa`ida, the true decision-makers within the senior leadership remained entirely committed to al-Zawahiri and his transnational movement. Although one aspect of this commitment was to abide by al-Zawahiri’s early 2015 instruction to “not use Syria as a base for attacks against the West,” al-Julani made clear that al-Qa`ida was likely plotting such operations from elsewhere.[35]

Nevertheless, in an interview with U.S. convert and freelance journalist Bilal Abdul Kareem in August 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra chief spokesman Abu Firas al-Suri—a confidante of Bin Ladin since 1983—left nothing to the imagination regarding his group’s strategic outlook: “Our goals are not limited to Syria, but our current battle is.”[36]

Shifting Dynamics 
As with most asymmetric conflicts, the dynamics of the Syrian insurgency are continually changing and since late 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra’s principal enabler, Ahrar al-Sham, has been moderating its ideological and political outlook. Initially launched by its founding leader Hassan Abboud, this moderation has seen the group publish a Revolutionary Covenant on May 17, 2014, which pointedly excluded any desire for an “Islamic State.” More recently, Ahrar al-Sham called for dialogue with the United States in July 2015 editorials in the Washington Post[37] and the Daily Telegraph[38] and has begun a limited engagement with several European states.[39]

While such developments may have minimally affected Ahrar al-Sham’s relationship with Jabhat al-Nusra, recent developments have revealed potentially substantial differences between the two. After working together successfully to capture Idlib in late March, the civil administration project that Jaish al-Fateh had hoped to establish, and which Jabhat al-Nusra had been persuaded to support, had failed to develop.

Jabhat al-Nusra has therefore periodically begun imposing its will locally, including by pressing Druze communities to convert to Islam, to send their sons to Jabhat al-Nusra training camps, and for their men to give up personal weapons as fealty to the group.[40] The killing of 23 Druze in the Idlib village of Qalb Loza in mid-June and several other incidents throughout June and early July sparked a series of anti-Jabhat al-Nusra demonstrations in Idlib in early July. Small units of Jabhat al-Nusra foreign fighters even attacked facilities belonging to the Ahrar al-Sham-dominated “Sharia Authority” in the towns of Khan Sheikhoun, Kafr Sajna, and Kafr Nubl on July 8 in an apparent show of force.[41]

With tensions bubbling away in Idlib and with Ahrar al-Sham reaching out to the West, the arrival of U.S.-trained New Syrian Force fighters in northern Aleppo saw Jabhat al-Nusra demonstrate its more hard-line tendencies. Although it went unreported, Jabhat al-Nusra aggressively confronted the initial batch of 54 soldiers almost as soon as they arrived in Syria on July 14,[42] underlining its hostility to anyone suspected of supporting U.S. interests. Two weeks later, Jabhat al-Nusra kidnapped their leader and attacked the base of their broader unit, Division 30, drawing U.S. airstrikes.

By this point, Turkey had already opened Incirlik Airbase for U.S. operations against the Islamic State and had begun its own limited airstrikes as part of efforts to establish a safe zone in northern Aleppo. Following a series of meetings convened by the Turkish intelligence agency on July 27 and July 28 that brought together the leaders of more than a dozen Syrian opposition groups active in Aleppo, rumors swirled that a Turkish-backed zone free of Islamic State, and possibly, Syrian regime airstrikes was in the works.[43]

Having been excluded from such plans and meetings, Jabhat al-Nusra entered into talks on August 4, 2015 with Ahrar al-Sham and several representatives of the Aleppo-based coalition Al-Jabhat al-Shamiya. According to three sources linked to the meeting, Jabhat al-Nusra’s representatives made it clear that they opposed a Turkey-backed project in northern Aleppo and threatened to resume plotting attacks against Western targets should Turkey’s project include anti-al-Qa`ida objectives. Notwithstanding such threats—“this is normal Nusra behavior,” said one source and “they wouldn’t do such a stupid thing,” said another[44]—all other groups in the room wholeheartedly supported Ankara.[45] After a day of talks, the Istanbul-headquartered Syrian Islamic Council—close to many mainstream Syrian Islamic factions—announced the legality of cooperating with Turkey’s safe zone. The following day, Jabhat al-Nusra withdrew from its positions in northern Aleppo and an August 9 statement made clear that it could not be part of a project it saw as serving “Turkey’s national security.”[46]

To underline the significance of Jabhat al-Nusra’s strategic isolation on this issue, its most valuable Syrian ally, Ahrar al-Sham, declared on August 11 its support for Ankara’s plans and its utmost admiration for Turkey’s “ethical and humanitarian position” in Syria and further stated that Turkey was “the most important ally of the Syrian revolution.”[47]

By mid-August, these shifting dynamics had shaken the foundations of the once relatively stable factional relationships across northern Syria. Faced with such change, Jabhat al-Nusra was revealing its fundamentalist core.

Ahrar al-Sham’s broader internal political evolution and outreach to the West, however, had upset some of its leaders. Although its editorials reflected four months of internal deliberation, Ahrar al-Sham’s religious leadership—headed by a Kurd, Abu Mohammed al-Sadeq—opposed some aspects of the group’s overt alignment with nationalist projects. A debate ensued between leaders during a series of meetings in northern Syria and southern Turkey in mid-August. According to several sources involved in the discussions, the leaders discussed the possibility of replacing the group’s “first row” of leaders with “more highly qualified and experienced” (in other words more moderate) figures, in line with the end of Hashem al-Sheikh’s 12-month term as leader on September 10, 2015.[48]

With its most powerful and indispensable ally seemingly aligning itself with increasingly divergent ideological and strategic positions—at least at a leadership level—Jabhat al-Nusra’s position in Syria looks potentially unstable. However, for a majority of the Syrian opposition, Jabhat al-Nusra remains an indispensable military partner in the battle against the al-Assad regime. By continuing to demonstrate its value on the battlefield, such political differences may be papered over, for the time being.

A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing 
While the Islamic State’s shock-and-awe strategy has helped its expansion around the world, al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership has come under significant pressure and the operational independence of its affiliates has increased. Consequently, Jabhat al-Nusra and, more recently, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula [See Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP: A Resurgent Threat” in this issue, p. 19] have sought to implement a diametrically opposed strategy to that of the Islamic State, in which ideological extremism is temporarily downplayed in favor of implanting more sustainably within exploitable communities.

The sheer complexity of the conflict in Syria has made this strategy particularly challenging for Jabhat al-Nusra. At times, its real nature has emerged, sparking a Syrian-led backlash and a conscious and top-down moderation of Jabhat al-Nusra’s behavior. Each of these phases has represented a test of the group’s structural unity, and until late 2014 those tests had underlined al-Julani’s successful ability to maintain internal loyalty.

However, Turkey’s overt military intervention and the arrival of U.S.-trained fighters in July have fundamentally shaken up the favorable dynamics that Jabhat al-Nusra had contributed toward. With internal political and ideological debates threatening to split its central leadership and with its key Syrian allies now potentially adopting more overt nationally focused strategic visions, al-Qa`ida hardliners appear to be emerging as the new face of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Al-Julani’s long-time balancing of differing ideological outlooks within his top command may be less viable.

The intensity of Jabhat al-Nusra’s focus on ensuring al-Qa`ida’s long-term durability in Syria since 2012 should still be a serious concern. The group’s majority Syrian makeup—60–70 percent[49]—contributes to a crucial level of social grounding and is the reason why several prominent Syrian Salafists have launched secret initiatives encouraging local members to leave al-Qa`ida for more overtly Syrian groups. Meanwhile, Jabhat al-Nusra’s strict and highly selective foreign fighter recruitment policies have ensured an ongoing supply of high-caliber muhajireen truly committed to al-Qa`ida’s cause.

Jabhat al-Nusra has faced challenges to its position within the Syrian revolution before and has escaped unscathed or has emerged in an even better position. Although the current challenge may well prove the most significant so far, the group’s Syrian core and the continued intensity of the fight against regime forces remain its best insurance policies.
Ultimately though, Jabhat al-Nusra is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Although Syrians, including even some Islamists, appear to be waking up to that reality, there is simply no appetite to turn against it militarily. Jabhat al-Nusra has refused to play a role in any Turkish-backed operations against the Islamic State, but it will almost certainly maneuver in such a way as to benefit its own prospects. The longer Jabhat al-Nusra is able to keep playing its subtle game, the more durable al-Qa`ida’s stronghold in Syria will be.

Charles Lister is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and author of the forthcoming book, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Hurst Publishers & Oxford University Press), expected November 2015. Follow him on Twitter @Charles_Lister.

Putin’s Plan: What Will Russia Bomb in Syria?

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to order his military into Syria may simply have been the gut reaction of a hard-power ruler who, for lack of tools other than a hammer, can imagine no problem other than a nail. But dispatching the Russian Air Force in support of the embattled Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad may also have been a true political masterstroke, in which case its political impact is likely to make a far bigger crater than any of the bombs that Putin is preparing to drop on Syria.

The first indications of a Russian military deployment in Syria leaked out in late August. It gradually became clear thatsomething big was happening at the Basil al-Assad International Airport near Latakia in government-controlled western Syria. Not only was Assad’s army getting new weapons, it was also getting new comrades-in-arms.

According to satellite imagery reviewed by the Washington Post and The Aviationist, a specialist blog, the Russian expeditionary corps has now grown to nearly thirty Sukhoi combat aircraft. Most are SU-24 and SU-25 models that fly “low and slow” in order to take out ground targets, but there are also a few SU-30 jets—a “game changer,” according to a pilot interviewed by the Post, since this multi-role fighter could pose a serious threat to American aircraft in Syria.

Apart from the Sukhoi jets, the airport has also become home to several Mi-24 attack helicopters, transport aircraft, air defense systems, and an unknown number of remotely piloted drones. In addition, there is a small but growing ground force, although it is not clear whether it could be tasked with more than guarding the air base and surrounding areas. Russian forces have been seen embedding with Syrian forces, although it is perhaps as trainers or coordinators.

Today, Wednesday, satellite imagery also revealed two more Russian outposts. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has said that American intelligence indicates that these bases are not so much the start of an additional deployment as defensive outposts serving to protect the initial air base.

POLITICAL RESULTS

The deployment is military, but its first and perhaps most important effects are political.Israel, which occasionally attacks what it says are Hezbollah targets inside Syria, and theUnited States have already met with the Russians to “deconflict,” a military term for how to avoid accidents and unwanted clashes.

Israel couldn’t care less about public opinion in Syria, but for the United States, this is an embarrassing position to be in. There is already much ill will among Syrian rebels over U.S. strikes on al-Qaeda targets within the anti-Assad guerrillas. The White House may continue to insist that Bashar al-Assad must step down, but the U.S. Air Force will henceforth be sharing Syrian airspace with both Assad’s own air force—which is notorious for its unrelenting bombing of civilian neighborhoods and infrastructure—and with a Russian expeditionary corps sent to aid him. It won’t be popular with American allies.

By introducing Russian jets and air defense systems into the Syrian theatre, Putin has also created facts on the ground (or just above it) that will help forestall further action against Assad by the United States or its allies. American Syria policy is currently under scrutiny and if internal White House debates about Assad were indeed moving in the do-something direction as some claim, then Vladimir Putin has just served up a brand new counter-argument.

Whether by accident or design, the Latakia deployment will also draw attention to Vladimir Putin’s appearance before the United Nations General Assembly in late September, his first in ten years. The Russian leader has been trying to promote aninternational coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, of which Assad would be a part. Having just thrown his gauntlet down in Latakia, Putin won’t necessarily gain a more sympathetic hearing from the world leaders assembled in New York, but they’re sure to listen very closely.

MILITARY RESULTS

Although the Russian intervention seems partly designed for political effect, those Sukhoi jets aren’t just going sit on a runway in Latakia for the benefit of satellite paparazzi. According to U.S. officials, Russian airstrikes in Syria are likely to begin “soon”—and as this article was being written, as-yet unconfirmed reports alleged that Russian jets were already backing a regime offensive in the Aleppo area.

Will the Russian Air Force be able to make a difference on the ground?

Yes, probably, says David A. Deptula—and he should know. A retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant-general and air warfare theoretician, Deptula planned the American bombing campaign against Saddam Hussein’s army in 1991, when the U.S. and its allies—including, at the time, Syria—liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Ten years later he oversaw the air war that toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

“With competent pilots and with an effective command and control process, the addition of these aircraft could prove very effective depending on the desired objectives for their use,” Deptula told the New York Times. Which begs the question, what are those objectives?

The Kremlin has couched its involvement in Syria in terms of a war against jihadi extremism. It also seeks to bring Assad out of the cold and into an international coalition against the so-called Islamic State. In other words, focusing attacks on the Islamic State seems like a given, at least initially, but there are reasons to look at other targets, too.

But where and how could Russia maximize the impact of its strikes? Let’s look at some possible scenarios for the early stages of a Russian aerial intervention.

OPTION ONE: THE ISLAMIC STATE IN ALEPPO

At the time of writing, unconfirmed reports are coming in about Russian strikes in support of a sudden regime offensive striking out from eastern Aleppo. However, until now no evidence has emerged and it is important to remember that Syrian activist media, on both sides, is full of rumors. The news about a government offensive seems to be true, however, and reports indicate that it might be intended to relieve the Kweiris Airport, a small government-held pocket of land east of Aleppo that has long been under siege by the Islamic State. When other government enclaves in Syria’s north and east have fallen to the Islamic State, the captured soldiers have been summarily murdered in grotesque video-taped massacres that have unsettled pro-Assad constituencies and provoked angry reactions within the ranks.

Saving the Kweiris defenders would therefore provide both a political and a military boost for Assad, and it would help him clean up his frontlines in a crucial area of Syria.

Interestingly, an attack on the Kweiris pocket could also knock the Islamic State off balance in the Aleppo area, just as rebels north of the city are struggling to keep open their supply lines to Turkey against an Islamic State offensive. Coincidence or not, if Russia is involved, it would be an interesting first example of the potential interplay between offensives by Russian-backed army forces and U.S.-backed rebels.

The reports of Russian strikes near Kweiris remain unconfirmed for now. If they turn out to be true, it is possible that this will be a first area of focus. The Assad-Putin alliance could then try to change the balance of power in Aleppo. If they stick to Islamic State targets, instead of straying into battle with other rebels, a main ambition would probably be to push the jihadi group away from the government supply line between Aleppo and Hama in the south. The Assad-held areas of Aleppo are currently supplied by way of a hard-to-guard desert road that runs down through Sfeira, Khanaser, and Ithriya past the Ismaili-populated Salamiyeh area east of Hama. In the Salamiyeh area itself, the Islamic State has been nibbling away at the government’s perimeter defenses, but the desert road up to Aleppo has been a relatively tranquil front. Still, for Assad, the Islamic State’s presence just next to his Aleppo artery is a lethal threat.

OPTION TWO: THE ISLAMIC STATE EAST OF HOMS

Directly south of this region, there is another area where Assad is vulnerable to the Islamic State—the eastern Homs region. It is impossible to tell what Russian intentions are, but if we’re looking at likely places for Russian air support to Assad, the area between Homs and Palmyra must be close to the top of the list.

The fall of Palmyra in May this year opened up the desert fringes east of Homs to the Islamic State. This is a target-rich environment, to say the least, and Assad’s overstretched army must be distressed by the sudden emergence of a new and untenably long frontline.

The region also contains the Syrian government’s last remaining oil and gas fields, as well as the pipelines that come with them. The Syrian military air base known as T4, located in the middle of the desert west of Palmyra, has emerged as the anchoring point of government defensive positions shielding these fields against the Islamic State.

As Carnegie’s Yezid Sayigh wrote a few months ago, and as David C. Butter lays out in detail in this excellent Chatham House report, much of Syria’s power grid runs on natural gas. The state-run national electricity infrastructure still powers all Syrian government and some rebel and Islamic State territories, but 80 percent of the gas feeding its power stations comes from the fields east of Homs. If Assad lost these gas fields and installations, it would therefore have a double effect. It would be a devastating blow to the regime, which is already in a state ofstructural and financial disrepair, and it could seriously aggravate the economic and humanitarian crisis throughout Syria.

All this makes the Homs-Palmyra region a particularly appealing target for Russian intervention:

First, it helps Assad stave off Islamic State attacks and could even enable his forces to recapture Palmyra and shorten the eastern front.Second, it would publicly align Russia—and by extension Assad—with the United States and Europe in a joint struggle against the Islamic State. That’s exactly where Putin and Assad want to end up.Third, it would help keep Syrian state institutions running and prevent a deepening of the humanitarian disaster in Syria. That’s a goal widely shared among the opposition’s Western allies, even though many rebels tend to view Assad as a greater evil than the Islamic State. If an air campaign in Palmyra helps drive a wedge into the opposition camp or among its backers, so much the better from the point of view of Putin and Assad.

Could the Homs-Palmyra area be a place where Russia will focus its air support? Time will tell, but one thing is certain: no one is likely to object too loudly as long as Russian airstrikes are aimed only at the Islamic State and take place in this region. For all we know, the White House might even have quietly ushered the Russians towards Palmyra, fearing that it would otherwise have to fly those bombing runs on its own.

OPTION THREE: AL-QAEDA AND OTHERS IN THE NORTHWEST

Eastern Homs isn’t the only place where Assad is in a slow and painful retreat. This spring, the Syrian president was forced out of the city of Idlib and he has been losing ground ever since. By seizing Jisr al-Shughur and other towns in the area, the rebels have now opened up two venues of attack that threaten core regime areas. To the southwest lie the Alawite-populated mountains of the Latakia Governorate, from which much of the military elite hails. Due south of Jisr al-Shughur lie the Ghab Plains, a religiously mixed agricultural flatland that functions as the “soft underbelly” of Hama. So far, the Ghab seems to be where the rebels areconcentrating most of their firepower.

The groups digging their way down the Ghab are not aligned with the Islamic State. To the contrary, they are hostile to it. The centerpiece of the anti-Assad insurgency in this region is the Jaish al-Fatah (“Army of Conquest”), a coalition of Islamist groups. Its single biggest member faction is likely to beAhrar al-Sham, a hardline group backed by Turkey and Qatar. Many of its leaders hail from villages in the Ghab Plains, giving them even more reason to prioritize that battle.

However, the other big group in the Jaish al-Fatah coalition is the Nusra Front, which is al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. That makes the Syrian northwest another very tempting target for the Russians, for both political and military reasons. Unlike the Islamic State, the Nusra Front is well embedded in the wider Sunni Islamist landscape, meaning that Russian strikes would cause rebel outrage and a political stir among opposition backers. Yet, the U.S. has been bombing select Nusra Front targets for a year now and every country on earth considers al-Qaeda to be fair game.

The alliance between the terrorist-listedNusra Front and other rebels, which are backed by the Gulf States, Turkey, and the West, creates an opportunity for Putin to conduct strikes that would undoubtedly help Assad while also moving the target away from the Islamic State and toward more mainstream sections of the insurgency. If criticized, his enemies will be in the unenviable position of having to explain why the Russian government shouldn’t attack al-Qaeda. It is not the kind of argument that can be won in the West, at least not outside a very narrow circle of Syria wonks.

BLOWING UP YOUR NARRATIVE

If at some point Putin decides to target other groups than the Islamic State, he’s not likely to stop at the Nusra Front. Whether right off the bat or after a while, he could easily widen the circle of attacks from al-Qaeda and start blasting away at every rebel group in Idlib, Hama, and Latakia under the pretext that they are either “terrorists” or “terrorist allies.” On the ground, things are obviously a bit more complex and, just as obviously, Putin knows that—but he has nothing to gain from acknowledging it.

To the contrary, the Kremlin has every reason to continue blurring the already indistinct dividing line between “extremist” and “moderate” rebels upon which Western states insist. Even though this neatly black and white categorization of Syria’s murky insurgency is at least partly fiction, it remains a politically indispensable formula for Western states that wish to arm anti-Assad forces. Which is precisely why erasing this distinction by extending airstrikes against all manners of rebels as part of an ostensibly anti-jihadi intervention, may turn out to be Putin’s long-term plan.

Blanket attacks on Syrian rebels on the pretext that they are all “al-Qaeda” would lead to much outraged commentary in the Western and Arab press. But to the Russian president it doesn’t matter if you think he’s Mad Vlad or Prudent Putin. He isn’t trying to win hearts and minds, least of all those of the Syrian rebels or their backers. Rather, he is trying to change the balance of power on the ground while firing missile after missile into the West’s political narrative.

Whatever one thinks of that, it is a big and bold idea of the sort that sometimes end up working.

Afghan Taliban New Amir Mullah Akhtar Mansoor has quickly consolidated his position with very little opposition left against him

The Afghan Taliban say they have put aside disagreements and rallied around their new leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.

The announcement followed weeks of intensive efforts to unite the movement behind the man who succeeded Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar.

Following the announcement of Omar's death in July, Mullah Mansour was quickly installed as the new Amir ul-Mumineen, Commander of the Faithful.

The new emir's main challengers were Mullah Omar's brother and eldest son - until now relatively unknown, who questioned the way he was appointed.

But both eventually pledged loyalty to Mullah Mansour.

"Mullah Yaqoub, the son and Mullah Manan, the brother of Mullah Omar, swore their allegiances to the new leader in a splendid ceremony," Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid told the BBC last week, without revealing the location of the gathering.

"Now the movement will continue in a united manner."

In recent weeks, hundreds of Taliban commanders, fighters and clerics travelled in and out of Pakistan to try to overcome the open divisions.

Reports from the Pakistani city of Quetta near the Afghan border said the consultations required local supporters to host hundreds of Taliban in mosques, madrassas and private houses, and organise transport and supplies.

The effort put into overcoming the early challenge to Mullah Mansour's leadership suggests how important it was for the movement to preserve unity.

Waheed Mozhda, a Kabul-based expert who used to work in the Taliban foreign ministry before they were driven from power in 2001, says the group realises that unity is key to their survival.
"Their enemies are stronger than they are and therefore they know that if there are differences they will be wiped out," Mr Mozhda says.

Barnett Rubin, a leading US expert on Afghanistan, says the Taliban have been bound together by a coherent ideology that has so far prevented any splits.

"The Taliban were founded to put an end to factionalism and there is a strong presumption against it," says Mr Rubin,

"Everyone follows the commands of the emir. There have been dissident individuals who left or were expelled from the organisation, but once they were expelled or left, they lost all influence."

One potential rival to the Afghan Taliban has emerged with some insurgents in Afghanistan declaring allegiance to the Islamic State group which claims a presence in some parts of the country. But observers say these are a few disgruntled fighters.

"Some Taliban with grievances against the leadership and who found it impossible to organise factions, instead left the organization and joined IS but their number is too small to impose any serious to the movement" says Barnett Rubin.

There are still some challengers to the new emir's authority.
But despite these challenges, the AAN's Borhan Osman thinks there is no sign that the Taliban are seriously weakening.

"The fight is going [on] as intensive as ever. So we don't see any changes on the ground, so far at least."

Ahrar al-Shaam will play bigger role in Syrian scenario

When an explosion killed almost all of its leaders in a single blow last year, many thought it was the end for Ahrar al-Sham, a powerful Syrian insurgent group founded by members loyal to al Qaeda.

But the group immediately re-emerged stronger. It replaced its leader and chose new military commanders. A few months later, it joined a coalition of insurgent groups that seized the city of Idlib with at least 2,000 fighters, making it the most influential group in the Fatah Army (Army of Conquest), which includes al Qaeda’s Syria wing, the Nusra Front.

The group now has even loftier ambitions.

With strong backing from Syria’s neighbour Turkey, Ahrar al-Sham (the Free Men of Syria) is playing a significant role in Syria’s four year old civil war - if not the biggest among insurgent group apart from Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Its fighters control Bab al-Hawa, the only legal crossing between Turkey and Syria’s rebel-held areas, and are powerful around Aleppo and Idlib.

The emergence of strong rebel groups such as Ahrar al-Sham which have political representation as well as military strength could help address a long-standing criticism of the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad: the disconnect between the constellation of armed groups in Syria and the Turkey-based political coalition that does not speak for any of them.

A western diplomat said that Ahrar al-Sham is seen as a decentralised, pragmatic group that is willing to work with other groups, and it will most likely have a say in any future peace talks.

While its late leadership showed no interest in the idea of ruling, Ahrar al-Sham’s current command appears to want a part in any long-term solution in Syria.

It is already negotiating with Assad’s government and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah over the fate of a rebel-held town near the border with Lebanon and two government-held Shiite towns under rebel siege in northwest province Idlib.

The talks, which have collapsed at least twice, are backed by Turkey and Iran, regional heavyweights on opposite sides of the conflict. They have given Ahrar al-Sham the advantage of negotiation experience in any future talks to find an end to the war.

They have also demonstrated Ahrar al-Sham’s standing among rebel groups, who have respected the ceasefire agreements it negotiated. That includes Nusra Front.

“Ahrar al-Sham is now a nucleus of a state,” said one of the group’s commanders, giving an interview to Reuters over the Internet on condition he not be identified. “Ahrar has a strong foundation, it consists of scientific and academic cadres that are not present in all of other Syria’s groups together.”

“The fact that the movement overcame the assassination of all its first line leaders quickly and had a strong comeback, shows that it is an institutional movement,” the commander added.

No one has claimed responsibility for the blast that killed the group’s leaders.

Since then, it has set up offices that deal with politics and military, religious, social and financial matters. Each bureau is independent but reports to a higher command.

“We as a movement still believe that one of the ways to achieve change is through arms. We cooperate with all groups on all fronts,” the commander said.

Despite its origins as an ally of al Qaeda, Ahrar al-Sham plays down any commitment to global jihad and emphasises its national credentials as a Syrian movement that respects the country’s borders. It says its fight is limited to the Syrian front.

Such a position would come as a relief to Western countries worried about jihad spreading to Europe and elsewhere.

Aware of the West’s growing fear of the influence and strength of hardline jihadist groups inside Syria, Ahrar al-Sham has published editorials in two Western newspapers, distancing itself from hardliners and saying it would protect religious minorities.

It also opposes the ultra-hardline group ISIS.
Qaeda links?

When it was formed, it had strong ties with the leadership of al Qaeda. Its slain top commander Abu Khaled al-Soury fought alongside al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and was close to bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Since the deaths of its leadership, it had an interim leader until last week, when it finally selected Abu Yahya al-Hamawi as new permanent leader. A civil engineer and veteran militant in his 30s, the new leader reached out to other rebel groups in his first message, promising they would be included in any deal his group strikes.

“We will all be partners in the decision and in the execution of it,” he said on his Twitter account.

Due to its strong relationship to Turkey and its decision to take part in talks with the Syrian government, it has sometimes come under criticism from other rebel groups.

Under its new leadership it is trying to differentiate itself from al Qaeda, angering the Nusra Front and other hardliners. But its al Qaeda-linked background means Ahrar al-Sham still has a special relationship with the Nusra Front.

Rebels inside Syria say Ahrar al-Sham supplied many of Nusra’s weapons. It was not clear if it was still doing so.

A former Nusra fighter who has now left the war said Nusra and Ahrar once had strong relations.

“All I know is that Nusra sees Ahrar as their source for weapons, especially in some battles,” he said. “They are moving away from military work and putting their strength in administrating liberated areas.”

“Their strength is evident in running the Bab al-Hawa crossing. They control it after kicking everyone else out and hence they control the trade in and out of Syria, putting the transfer of goods to all Syria under their control. They have become self-funded after imposing taxes on goods coming into Syria,” he said.

It is not only other rebel groups that are keeping a close eye on Ahrar al-Sham’s rise - its enemies are equally watchful.

“We have noticed they are trying to distance themselves from Qaeda but they remain Salafis, this cannot be denied,” said a military commander on the Syrian government side who is also close to negotiations with the group. Salafis are followers of the austere form of Sunni Islam preached by al Qaeda.

“Unlike most Syrian insurgents, they do have a structure and their fighters are loyal to the leadership and effectively implement its orders.”

US-trained Division 30 rebels 'betrayed US and hand weapons over to al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria'

Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated to al-Qaeda, took the technicals, guns and ammunition from the US-trained Division 30 in northern Aleppo

Pentagon-trained rebels are reported to have betrayed US and handed weapons over to Jabhat al-Nusra immediately after entering Syria

Pentagon-trained rebels are reported to have betrayed US and handed weapons over to an al-Qaeda affiliate immediately after entering Syria.

Fighters with Division 30 surrendered and handed over "all its weapons" to Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, sources alleged on Monday.

The moderate rebel group was the first faction to graduate from a US-led training programme in Turkey which aims to forge a fighting force on the ground in Syria to fight against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil).

"A strong slap [in the face] for America... the new group from Division 30 that entered yesterday hands over all of its weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra after being granted safe passage," tweeted Abu Fahd al-Tunisi, who purports to be a member of the al-Qaeda affiliate.

"They also handed over a very large amount of ammunition and medium weaponry and a number of pick-ups."

Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi, who also claims to be a Nusra member, added that Anas Ibrahim Obaid, Division 30's commander, had explained to al-Nusra's leaders that he had tricked the coalition because he needed weapons.

"He promised to issue a statement... repudiating Division 30, the coalition, and those who trained him," tweeted Maqdisi on Monday.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a pro-opposition UK-based watchdog, reported on Sunday that 75 Division 30 fighters had crossed into Syria from Turkey the previous morning with “12 four-wheel vehicles equipped with machine guns and ammunition".

US Central Command said in a news release on Monday that about 70 graduates of the Syria Train and Equip programme had re-entered Syria with their weapons and equipment and were operating as New Syrian Forces alongside Syrian Kurds, Sunni Arabs and other anti-Isil forces.

“With support from the coalition, the NSF will fight alongside vetted opposition forces and employ their training and equipment acquired through the T&E programme,” continued the statement.

Last month, Jahbat al-Nusra militants engaged in a rout against Division 30’s forces, kidnapping their commander and storming the group’s headquarters.

News of the surrender comes days after the resignation of Division 30’s chief of staff, who cited a lack of seriousness in the training programme.

In the statement, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad al-Dhaher complained of insufficient numbers of trainees and fighters, inadequate supplies, and even “a lack of accuracy and method in the selection of Division 30’s cadres”.

The latest developments have only added to the scorn heaped on the much-criticized $500 million (£320 million) program, which aims to forge a 5,400-strong force of “moderate” rebels to combat Isil.

Division 30 has been hampered by problems almost from the outset, with rebels complaining of a laborious vetting process and an injunction against fighting forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Last Wednesday, General Lloyd Austin, commander of US Central Command, shocked senate leaders in the armed services committee when he said the programme had yielded only a handful of fighters.

"We're talking four or five," said Gen Austin.

Putin is turning the Syrian coast into another Crimea.

After weeks of dancing around the issue, the Obama administration has expressed concern about “heightened military activity” by Russia in Syria.

But what if we are facing something more than “heightened military activity?” What if Moscow is preparing to give Syria the full Putin treatment?

For years, Russia has been helping Syrian despot Bashar al-Assad cling to a diminishing power structure in a shrinking territorial base without trying to impose an overall strategy.
Now, however, there are signs that Russia isn’t content to just support Assad. It wants to control Syria.

Putin has long wanted to seize a Mediterranean port, and the current conflict in Syria presents the perfect opportunity.Photo: AP; Getty Images

The Putin treatment is reserved for countries in Russia’s “near neighborhood” that try to break out of Moscow’s orbit and deprive it of strategic assets held for decades.

In such cases, unable to restore its past position, Russia tries to create a new situation in which it keeps a sword dangling above the head of the recalcitrant nation.

Russia’s military intervenes directly and indirectly, always with help from a segment of the local population concerned. Russia starts by casting itself as protector of an ethnic, linguistic or religious minority that demands its military intervention against a central power vilified with labels such as “fascist” and “terrorist.”

The first nation to experience the Putin treatment was Georgia in 2008, when Russian tanks moved in to save the Persian-speaking Ossetian minority and the Turkish-speaking Abkhazians from “the fascist regime” in Tbilisi.

Initially, Putin had feared that the US or the European Union might not let his war of conquest go unpunished. But nothing happened. President Obama talked of “reset” with Moscow, agreed to set up a joint committee to look into the matter and then allowed the whole thing to fade away.

Tested in Georgia with success, the Putin treatment was next applied to Ukraine, where a pro-West regime was talking of joining the European Union and even NATO. Russia intervened in Crimea to “save” its Russian-speaking majority from oppression.

Facing no opposition, Putin simply annexed Crimea before giving the Donetsk area of eastern Ukraine the same treatment, this time with the help of “Russian volunteers” coming to help fellow Russian-speakers.

In Ossetia, Putin gained control of key passages to Chechnya and upper Caucasus.

In Abkhazia, he extended Russian presence on the Black Sea.

In Crimea, he saved the Russian Navy’s largest base.

In Donetsk he obtained a political pistol aimed at the temple of the government in Kiev.

Pro-West Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is threatened after Putin helped Armenia snatch the enclave of Upper Qarabagh (Nagorno Karabakh) in Transcaucasia.
What about Syria?
Modal Trigger
Residents look for survivors in a damaged site after a barrel bomb was reportedly dropped by forces loyal to al-Assad, in Aleppo in September.Photo: Reuters

The Soviet Union had a military presence in Syria since 1971, when Hafez al-Assad, father of the present despot, signed a defense pact with Moscow. The pact gave Russia mooring rights in two of Syria’s ports, Latakia and Tartus on the Mediterranean. The older Assad, however, shied away from granting Russians permanent bases.

Former Syrian president Hafez al-Assad (Bashar’s father, pictured here in 1977) signed a defense pact with Moscow in 1971, but never allowed a permanent Russian base.Photo: Getty Images

Last year, Putin asked Bashar to let Russia build aero-naval assets on the Syrian coast to facilitate support for the regime in Damascus. Then still hopeful of surviving the civil war, Bashar managed to dodge the issue with help from his allies in Tehran.

Now, however, both Assad and the mullahs of Tehran know that they cannot fight this war much longer. Assad has publicly admitted he does not have enough men to keep the territory he still controls let alone recapture what he has lost amounting to 60% of the Syrian landmass. Reluctant to risk Iranian lives, the mullahs have sent Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and “volunteers” from Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight for Assad. But they, too, have suffered irreparable losses.

After weeks of talks between Assad and the Russians with the mullahs also engaged by both sides, it now seems that Russia has obtained what it wanted: the right to build permanent aero-naval bases on the Syrian coast. Recent satellite images show that massive construction work has already started. At the same time, Russia has won control of Bassel al-Assad airport, the second-largest in Syria, transforming it into a hub for its “air-bridge” operations spanning Iranian and Iraqi air spaces.

Satellite images show a Latakia airfield being turned into a Russian military base.Photo: Reuters

Russia is bringing in new aircraft and surface-to-surface missile ostensibly for transfer to Syrian forces but in reality under direct Russian control. According to estimates in the Iranian media, Russia now has some 20,000 military “technicians and advisors” in Syria.

The stage is set for the full Putin treatment. Russia no doubt looks to the 1920s scheme under which Syria was divided into five segments, with France, then the colonial power, retaining direct control only of the area between the mountains west of Damascus and the Mediterranean coast. The French called that “la Syrie utile” (useful Syria) allowing the rest of the country, much of it thinly inhabited desert to morph into ungoverned territory.

Accounting for about 15% of territory, “Useful Syria” is now home to more than half of the population, partly thanks to influx of displaced people from other parts of the country. The strip between the coast and the mountains has the added advantage of being the principal base of the Alawite community to which Assad and his clan belong.

Get ready for Russia to cast itself as the protector, not only of the Alawites but also of other minorities such as Turcoman, Armenians and, more interestingly for Moscow, Orthodox Christians who have fled Islamist terror groups such as ISIS.

Russia has always seen itself as the “Third Rome” and the last standard-bearer of Christianity against both Catholic “deviation” and Islamist menace.

By controlling a new mini-state, as a “safe haven for minorities,” Russia could insist that if Syria returns to some normality it be reconstituted as a highly decentralized state. This is what Putin is also demanding in Georgia and Ukraine.

The Syrian coast will become another Crimea, if not completely annexed, at least occupied.

Unless stopped, the Putin treatment will not end in Syria. The two next candidates could be Moldova and Latvia, both of which have large Russian-speaking minorities.

On Friday, Russian fighter jets arrived in Syria. US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded by saying he had a “constructive conversation” with his Russian counterpart, who insisted the buildup was “defensive in nature.” Carter said discussions would continue. In other words, Russia will continue to carve a foothold on the Mediterranean.

While President Obama practices a postmodern diplomacy of perceptions — in other words window-dressing — Putin perfects his pre-modern power play.

Putin has arranged it so that no matter what happens in Syria, he wins — and we lose.

The Concept of Bay‘a in the Islamic State’s Ideology

Abstract

Given the long roots of bay‘a (pledge of allegiance) in Islamic tradition and the controversial claim by the Islamic State (IS) to be a caliphate, the application of bay‘a to the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his project is a contested issue among radical Islamists. Based on secondary literature and IS ideologues’ own writings, this paper analyses IS’s claims of validity in their calls for allegiance to “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and how radical Islamist critics of IS have responded to this. IS’s arguments resemble quite closely the theories on bay‘a that its jihadi opponents themselves claim to adhere to. Although the latter take their inspiration from early Islam and far less so from the theories that developed afterwards, it sometimes also appears as if they have idealised the caliphate so much that they find its reality as represented by IS hard to swallow.

Keywords: Jihadism, ISIS, ideology, theology, allegiance

Introduction

After the leader of the Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared a caliphate (khilafa) on 29 June 2014, his spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, stated that “pledging allegiance (mubaya‘a) and giving assistance to the caliph (khalifa) […] has become incumbent upon all Muslims.”[1] Such pledges of allegiance (bay‘a) have since been given by numerous radical Islamist groups from around the world, including in Afghanistan/Pakistan[2], the Sinai desert[3], North Africa[4] and Nigeria[5] as well as others[6]. Some pledges have been announced on the Internet, others in the real world.[7] IS has also publicly accepted some of these pledges as signs of its expansion[8], although they appear to be carefully vetted and are therefore not always (immediately) approved by al-Baghdadi.[9]

Such expressions of allegiance to IS may give the impression that bay‘a is something radical Muslims agree upon. This is not the case, however. Given the long roots of the concept in Islamic tradition and the controversial claim by IS to be a caliphate, the pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and his group is a contested issue among radical Islamists. Based on secondary literature and IS ideologues’ own writings, this paper analyses IS’s claims of validity in their calls for allegiance to “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This topic has briefly been dealt with by Cole Bunzel in his analysis of IS’s claim to be a caliphate[10], but it merits further attention because much of the discussion on IS’ legitimacy partly hinges on this concept. In what follows, I will first deal with the meaning and application of the concept of bay‘a in classical and modern Islam and then show how the Islamic State legitimises the pledge of allegiance to its supposed caliph. As we will see, much of the discussion on bay‘a pivots around the question of whether or not IS is a legitimate caliphate. Moreover, although its critics are in favour of a caliphate in theory, they seem to shy away from it in practice.

Bay‘a in Classical and Modern Islam

The meaning of the term “bay‘a” is not entirely clear. It is said to refer to the Arabic verb ba‘a-yabi‘u (to sell), which would denote a sort of sale of one’s allegiance to somebody else. Others claim it is rooted in the physical act of clasping someone’s hand known as “bay‘a”, which was used to indicate the conclusion of an agreement between people and was based on an ancient Arab custom. This latter meaning is said to have been applied to the election of and submission to a leader, which similarly involved the clasping of a person’s hand and was therefore naturally also labelled “bay‘a”.[11] It is in the latter sense that early Muslims seem to have used the concept. Milton tells the story of believers pledging allegiance to the Prophet by physically touching Muhammad through the holding of hands. This allegedly led to the revelation of Qur’an 48:18[12], which states that “God was well pleased with the believers when they were swearing fealty to thee (idh yubayi‘unaka).”[13]

Bay‘a and the Caliphate

Broadly speaking, this pledging of allegiance to a person of authority has become the practical meaning of the term “bay‘a” in Islam. It was first and foremost applied to the Prophet but, after his death, also to other leaders of the Muslim community, primarily the caliph, the successor to the Prophet in political affairs and in upholding Islamic rule. This pledge of allegiance to a caliph would ideally take place through his election, but it could also happen through appointment by his predecessor. According to ‘ulama’ (Muslim scholars), the caliph himself had to satisfy several conditions, including ruling on the basis of justice (‘adala), possessing knowledge (‘ilm) of Islamic tradition and law, having physical and mental fitness, being courageous and determined, waging jihad and being a descendant of the Quraysh tribe, which the Prophet Muhammad himself also belonged to.[14]

The bay‘a of a caliph thus constituted a contract (‘ahd or ‘aqd) in which not only the latter was involved as the person receiving fealty, but also those voluntarily expressing the wish to obey their leader. The ‘ulama’ differ, however, on the number of people required to pledge allegiance by electing the caliph (ahl al-ikhtiyar) for the bay‘a to be legitimate, ranging from all “upright men” in Muslim empires to a single person. In practice, the actual electors were mostly officials with senior positions in the caliphate referred to generally as the “people of loosening and binding” (ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd), whose oaths of fealty were seen as binding upon themselves and the larger Muslim community, particularly since they were not just undertaken towards the caliph, but – by extension – also towards God. As such, scholars saw violating the bay‘a as punishable by death, unless the caliph did not live up to his duty to uphold the rules and regulations of Islam, in which case those who pledged allegiance were freed from their obligations towards the ruler.[15]

The seriousness with which (a violation of) the bay‘a was treated by the ‘ulama’ is a reflection of the strong tradition of obedience (ta‘a) to the caliph that had developed in the Sunni Islamic tradition.[16] On the one hand, this can be ascribed to the supposed Qur’anic basis of the caliphate[17], which is said to be found in verses such as Q. 2:30 (“And when thy Lord said to the angels, ‘I am setting in the earth a viceroy (inni ja‘il fi l-ard khalifa)’”)[18], as well as the Qur’an’s call on believers to express obedience to such rulers, as in Q. 4:59 (“Oh believers, obey God (ati‘u llah), and obey the Messenger (wa-ati‘u l-rasul) and those in authority among you (wa-uli l-amr minkum)”).[19] On the other hand, such obedience was also inspired by the belief that almost anything (even an unjust and oppressive ruler) was preferable to fitna (chaos, strife) and civil war among Muslims in the absence of powerful leadership, which might cause the entire Islamic empire to collapse.[20]

At the same time, however, it was clear that in practice, bay‘a could not be expressed to the caliph by every single Muslim, even if the process of pledging allegiance was not confined to a private oath by a limited number of dignitaries (bay‘at al-khassa) and a variable number of subsequent public fealty-swearing occasions (bay‘at al-‘amma) was added.[21] Moreover, the Muslim world may have been nominally ruled by a caliph, but local leaders soon emerged whose actual power was sometimes greater than that of the ruler himself, further complicating the direct bay‘a from the people to the caliph. Given that in classical Islamic political thought, all power flows down from the caliph and other sources of political authority cannot exist[22], a solution had to be found for this.

Muslim scholars such as al-Mawardi (974-1058) solved the contradiction – between theoretically only having one caliph who enjoys everyone’s allegiance and practically having several actual rulers – by describing local leaders as at least theoretically subservient to the caliph and dependent on the latter’s approval.[23] Later ‘ulama’ tended more towards the recognition of the authority of non-caliphal rulers in and of themselves, besides the caliph.[24] In the writings of al-Ghazali (1058-1111), the actual person in power – the sultan – must still pledge allegiance to the caliph, but he is also the one who gets to decide who the caliph should be.[25] The role of the sultan was further increased at the expense of the caliph by the scholar Ibn Jama‘a (1241-1333), who added the usurpation of caliphal power to the other two ways of attaining the caliphate – election and appointment – as a legitimate way of becoming caliph.[26] Under the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923), sultans even came to claim the title of caliph entirely for themselves, taking the usurpation of the caliphate to what could be described as its logical conclusion.[27]

Bay‘a after the Fall of the Caliphate

The above makes clear that the way the power and position of the caliph was legitimised by Muslim scholars shifted quite dramatically from absolute ruler to nominal leader. Subsequently, so did the means of making a pledge to his successor, changing from bay‘a through election of a new caliph or allegiance after the appointment by the previous caliph to implied loyalty to a usurping ruler. The development of Muslim thinking on these issues was greatly influenced by the actual practice of Islamic rule in their time, incorporating political reality into the theory of what constituted a valid bay‘a.[28] Thus, it was not a great surprise that the Ottoman sultans, who were clearly not descendents of the Quraysh tribe and therefore did not fulfil one of the conditions of the caliphate, nevertheless made use of the classical bay‘a ceremony whenever a new ruler became sultan.[29]

With the annulment of the caliphate by the newly formed Turkish republic in 1924, the whole idea of bay‘a to the caliph became obsolete. Given the flexible application of the concept, whose use was seemingly always partly a reflection of political considerations and power relations, it was only natural that the rulers of the states that arose in the Middle East after the demise of colonialism would use the concept of bay‘a again to legitimise their own rule.[30] Moreover, in the perceived absence of truly Islamic states, Muslim groups and organisations have sometimes also used bay‘a to indicate the relationship between their leaders and followers. This has been particularly the case with radical Islamist groups, including al-Qa‘ida[31], whose belief that the rulers of the modern-day Muslim world are “apostates” only strengthens their desire to provide an alternative to them.[32]

Muslim scholars opposed to political parties and certainly radical or violent groups, such as quietist Salafi scholars, reject the application of bay‘a to organisational leaders[33] and claim instead that such a pledge should only be given to the ruler, by which they usually mean the king or president of their country.[34] Yet the terms they associate with this pledge – ta‘a, wali l-amr (ruler) and, of course, bay‘a itself – are all strongly linked to the caliph. Thus, while they clearly apply the caliphal mandate to their country’s rulers in practice, they are quite vague about this in theory and have apparently not allowed bay‘a to make the theoretical leap from caliph to king. This ambiguity is at least partly kept alive by their use of the term amir al-mu’minin (leader of the faithful), which is a title applied to the caliph but has also been used to describe other rulers. As a consequence, some scholars’ practical application of bay‘a to contemporary kings seems to be an acceptance of reality framed in classical Islamic terms, rather than a new theoretical dimension of an age-old concept.[35] This ambiguity towards the modern-day applicability of bay‘a, combined with the claim by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to be the new caliph according to at least some of the norms of classical Islam, makes IS’ call for allegiance seem at least somewhat plausible. This, in turn, has hampered critics of IS in their efforts to refute the validity of the Islamic State’s bay‘a, to which we must now turn.

Bay‘a in IS’s Discourse and its Radical Islamist Critics

The supporters of the Islamic State now label their organisation a caliphate and its leader has assumed the title of caliph. This was not always the case, however, since IS used to be known under various other names, including “the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham” (ISIS). Even when the group did not claim to be a caliphate, however, the concept of “bay‘a” played a significant role in its discourse in a way that sometimes seemed to lay the groundwork for the foundation of the caliphate that was still to come.

Preparing for the Caliphate

One of the most prominent scholars involved in the debate on bay‘a of IS (and, before 29 June 2014, ISIS) was the Mauritanian scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, a prolific scholar about whom little is known other than his early support for ISIS. He stated in early 2013 that founding an Islamic state is important because in it lies “a reminder to the Muslims of the absent caliphate.”[36] This theme of having a caliph or imam[37] was developed further in a different document written by al-Shinqiti, in which he stated that appointing such a leader is actually a duty for all Muslims.[38] In fact, al-Shinqiti even stated that “its delay is disobedience (ma‘siya) through which all Muslims sin”[39], a sentiment that was echoed by other scholars sympathetic to ISIS in early 2014.[40]

The duty to appoint a caliph is followed, according to al-Shinqiti, by the equally necessary act of bay‘a to a leader who fits all the criteria of such a ruler. Objecting to this, he states, is forbidden and he lists examples from early Islamic history of Muslims rushing to perform bay‘a to make his point.[41] Al-Shinqiti also explicitly called on other jihadi movements in Iraq and Syria to pledge allegiance to ISIS and stated that maintaining one’s independence from that group is not allowed.[42] This is even the case, he claimed, if ISIS can be accused of making mistakes. “Despite that”, al-Shinqiti maintained, “the state remains the state. It is entitled to the legitimate pledge (al-bay‘a al-shar‘iyya) and listening to it and obeying it (al-sam‘ wa-l-ta‘a la-ha) is a duty.”[43] This need to be obedient to ISIS was also stressed in other writings, with one ISIS-supporting scholar going so far as to state that this group supersedes all other jihadi organisations and that not joining it will result in corruption (fasad) and the division of Muslims (tafriq al-muslimin).[44] It is therefore not surprising that, in early 2014, the Jordanian scholar ‘Umar b. Mahdi Al Zaydan called on Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra – which had been founded by ISIS but later turned against it – to stick to his previous bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, adding that he was the one that sent al-Jawlani to Syria on his behalf in the first place.[45]

To his supporters, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was more than worthy of people’s bay‘a. The Bahraini scholar Turki al-Bin‘ali (also known as Abu Humam al-Athari)[46] praised al-Baghdadi’s Qurashi descent, piety, knowledge, jihad experience, leadership, and cooperation skills.[47] Al-Baghdadi’s supporters rejected possible obstacles to pledging fealty to al-Baghdadi, such as the argument that ISIS had not settled in enough territory to justify bay‘a to its leader. The technical expression for this idea is that ISIS lacks tamkin (empowerment). Tamkin, however, is not a prerequisite for bay‘a, pro-ISIS scholars argued, because Muhammad himself did not control any territory and he was nevertheless given the pledge by his followers.[48] Moreover, they pointed out that ISIS does have territory under its control.[49] The same reasoning applied to ISIS’s power (shawka), which it needs to be able to qualify as a force to be reckoned with (and pledged allegiance to).[50]

The scholars supporting ISIS similarly pointed out that having few bay‘as from people is not an objection to being viewed as legitimate. As long as a small number pledge allegiance, that suffices.[51] Also, they dismissed the idea that al-Baghdadi should be well known to deserve the bay‘a and cite the aforementioned medieval scholar al-Mawardi to point out that a ruler need only be known to those directly involved in electing him.[52] Given the flexible rules on how bay‘a should be given (through election, by appointment or after usurpation), citing al-Mawardi here does not seem out of place, in fact. For similar reasons, the pro-ISIS scholars claimed that the permission of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd or the consultation (shura) of the scholars is not strictly necessary and only advisable.[53] Moreover, al-Athari claimed that al-Baghdadi did consult ‘ulama’ and that they agreed with him.[54]

IS’s Post-Caliphate Bay‘a

Given the case pro-ISIS scholars made for the bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, the founding of a caliphate was perhaps only a matter of time. When it was announced, however, there was a lot of criticism from radical Islamist scholars who supported al-Qa‘ida but found the newly announced IS a bridge too far. Some radical Islamist critics point out that they do not object to a caliphate as such, of course, but that IS has created divisions with its caliphate by leaving the overarching framework formed by al-Qa‘ida, and they advise its leaders to correct their mistakes and return to that organisation.[55] Others refer to stricter conditions for a bay‘a-worthy caliphate by pointing out that only succession and election through the majority of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd are valid forms of giving allegiance to the caliph.[56]

More interesting than this general criticism is the argument that there already was a caliph: Taliban leader Mullah ‘Umar. As Bunzel has shown, after the announcement of the caliphate by IS, al-Qa‘ida – clearly aware of IS’s challenge to its previously almost undisputed role of jihadi king of the hill – began promoting the view that its first leader, Osama bin Laden, had pledged a “supreme bay‘a” to Mullah ‘Umar, thereby indicating that he was the caliph and that al-Baghdadi’s claims were null and void. Although this line of thinking was muddled somewhat by the fact that the current leader of al-Qa‘ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had apparently been less unambiguous in his bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar, the organisation stuck to this defence of their “own” caliphate.[57]

Al-Qa‘ida’s line of defence against IS’s rival caliphate was supported – surprisingly – by one of the staunchest supporters of ISIS: Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti. The latter stated in July 2014 that bay‘a had been given to Mullah ‘Umar and even if his rule was not generally portrayed as a caliphate, this was nevertheless the case because of this pledge. The fact that “unbelievers” were now governing Afghanistan did not diminish Mullah ‘Umar’s bay‘a since, in an echo of an argument he had used earlier to defend ISIS, controlling territory is not strictly necessary for a bay‘a to be valid. All bay‘as, al-Shinqiti maintained, are subservient to the one given to Mullah ‘Umar, who is the legitimate imam whether people call him that way or not, and one therefore cannot simply found a second caliphate.[58] The fact that Mullah ‘Umar does not have Qurashi origins is not a problem, al-Shinqiti claimed, since people have already given bay‘a to him on the basis of the conditions of being an imam and have based their pledge on these.[59] The reality of the bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar, al-Shinqiti seemed to say, supersedes any claims that al-Baghdadi might have.

Al-Shinqiti’s words seemed to contradict his own earlier statement about ISIS: “…the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd who pledged allegiance to the leader of the state of Islam (i.e., ISIS) called it a ‘state’. They did not call it an ‘organisation’. Therein lies the clear proof that their bay‘a is a bay‘a on the basis of the supreme imamate (al-imama al-‘uzma), not on the basis of the smaller imamate (al-imama al-sughra).”[60] Although al-Shinqiti had, in fact, indicated more than a year before the announcement of IS’s caliphate that he believed Mullah ‘Umar was “the leader of the faithful”[61], supporters of IS were quick to point out his inconsistency.[62] Some of them argued that the Taliban cannot represent the caliphate because of their supposedly deviant religious views[63]; others pointed out that according to al-Qa‘ida itself, the bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar did not represent allegiance to the supreme imamate, but only to a partial one.[64] Still others stated that the bay‘a is a contract of which both parties involved want to know the conditions: “How can Mullah ‘Umar be caliph when nobody has known that until now!”[65] Another point of disagreement concerned the validity of the bay‘a to a supposed caliph of non-Qurashi descent. IS supporters insisted that this is a strict condition for the caliphate and thus also for the legitimacy of the bay‘a.[66] The validity of the latter concept, even though it is claimed by scholars who are ideologically largely alike and is derived from classical Islam, thus remains highly contested.

Conclusion

The concept of bay‘a in classical Islam refers to a reciprocal contract between the ruler and the ruled, with the latter giving his allegiance to the leader – usually the caliph – in exchange for protection and political and military leadership. It has its roots in the Qur’an, but mostly also in the practice of medieval Muslim rule, which ensured that the process of bay‘a – while ideally done through an election of a caliph – developed into a concept that could also be embodied by the appointment of a ruler or even the usurpation of his power. This increasing influence of what could be termed a “might makes right philosophy” was also discernable in the early jurists’ conditions for bay‘a to the caliph, especially his required Qurashi descent, which was often flouted by rulers.

Although various caliphs, modern-day kings and Islamic groups have used the bay‘a in ways that perhaps deviate from the concept’s classical meaning, the theoretical link with the caliph was always maintained. This made it relatively easy for IS to justify its invitation to Muslims to pledge allegiance to its newly founded caliphate in 2014. The fact that IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed to be a caliph seemed to make at least part of the tradition of bay‘a applicable to him and put the group one step ahead of its radical Islamist critics. It is therefore not surprising that IS’s jihadi opponents, in their efforts to dispute the validity of bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, focused mostly on questioning his claim to be a caliph.

Given the relatively wide-ranging bay‘a tradition, which is quite tolerant of oppressive and usurping rulers and within which IS seems to fit fairly neatly, the unwillingness of the Islamic State’s radical Islamist critics to accept the group’s claims is interesting. To be sure, there are real and important ideological differences between IS and its critics. Yet with regard to bay‘a, IS’s arguments resemble quite closely the theories that its jihadi opponents themselves claim to adhere to. Although the latter take their inspiration from early Islam and far less so from the theories that developed afterwards, it sometimes appears as if they have idealised the caliphate to such an extent that they find its reality as represented by IS hard to swallow. If that is indeed the case, it may be easier for them to postpone the announcement of an actual caliphate, to render it largely theoretical and to equate it with a romanticised ideal that might just come about one day.

About the author: Joas Wagemakers is assistant professor of Islamic Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen. He would like to thank Thomas Hegghammer, Nelly Lahoud, and Will McCants for their useful comments on an earlier version of this article.

Notes

[1] Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, Hadha Wa‘d Allah, online at: http://www.gulfup.com/?3D7MKR, n.d. (accessed 25 May 2015), 7.

[2] Don Rassler, “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 (March 2015): 7-11.

[3] Nelly Lahoud, “The Province of Sinai: Why Bother with Palestine if You can be Part of the ‘Islamic State’?” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 (March 2015): 12-4.

[4] Geoff D. Porter, “What to Make of the Bay‘a in North Africa?” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 (March 2015): 15-6.

[5] Jacob Zenn, “A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bay‘a to al-Baghdadi,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 (March 2015): 20-1.

[6] See www.ctc.usma.edu/isil-resources (accessed 25 may 2015).

[7] Philipp Holtmann, The Different Functions of IS Online and Offline Plegdes [sic!] (bay‘at): Creating a Multifaceted Nexus of Authority, online at http://jihadology.net/2014/11/15/guest-post-the-different-functions-of-is-online-and-offline-plegdes-bayat-creating-a-multifaceted-nexus-of-authority/, published 15 November 2014 (accessed 25 May 2015).

[8] “Remaining and Expanding,” Dabiq, no. 5 (Muharram 1436 [October/November 2014]): 22-33, esp. 25.

[9] Daniel Milton, “Pledging Bay‘a: A Benefit or Burden to the Islamic State?” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 (March 2015): 4-7.

[10] Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, Analysis Paper no. 19 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Center for Middle East Policy, 2015), 32-4; id., Al-Qaeda’s Quasi-Caliph: The Recasting of Mullah ‘Umar, online at: http://www.jihadica.com/al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-quasi-caliph-the-recasting-of-mullah-%E2%80%98umar/, published 23 July 2014 (accessed 28 May 2015). Bunzel’s blog post provided me with many of the sources used in this paper, for which I would like to thank him.

[11] Ella Landau-Tasseron, The Religious Foundations of Political Allegiance: A Study of Bay‘a in Pre-Modern Islam, Research Monographs on the Muslim World 2, no. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2010), 1; E. Tyan, “Bay‘a,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam – New Edition, Vol. I, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, J.H. Kramers, E. Lévi-Provençal, J. Schacht, B. Lewis and Ch. Pellat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986 [1960]), 1113.

[12] All Qur’anic quotations are from A.J. Arberry, trans., The Koran Interpreted (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996 [1955]), but with the Egyptian verse-numbering.

[13] Milton, “Pledging,” 2.

[14] E.I.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2009 [1958]), 29-30, 35-6, 40-41.

[15] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (New York: Routledge, 2001), 84-5; Rosenthal, Political, 44-5; Tyan, “Bay‘a,” 1113-4.

[16] Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 6-7.

[17] See also Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 5-6.

[18] The surrounding verses appear to indicate that this verse refers to Adam.

[19] Rosenthal, Political, 26.

[20] Black, History, 84, 103-4;

[21] Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 9; Rosenthal, Political, 31; Tyan, “Bay‘a,” 1113.

[22] Rosenthal, Political, 22-3.

[23] Black, History, 85-90.

[24] Ibid., 94.

[25] Ibid., 103-4; Rosenthal, Political, 39-41.

[26] Black, History, 143-4; Rosenthal, Political, 43-4. Scholars such as Ibn Hanbal (780-855) also legitimised the rule of successful usurpers of power a few centuries earlier. See Black, History, 84; Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 13.

[27] Black, History, 203-7.

[28] Rosenthal, Political, 31, 33, 38.

[29] Elie Podeh, “The Bay‘a: Modern Political Uses of Islamic Ritual in the Arab World,” Die Welt des Islams 50, no. 1 (2010): 125-7.

[30] Id., 127-48.

[31] Kévin Jackson, The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications, online at: http://jihadology.net/2012/07/27/guest-post-the-pledge-of-allegiance-and-its-implications/, published 27 July 2012 (accessed 27 May 2015).

[32] One group in Jordan even had the term “bay‘a” in its name, although this was not used by the members of the group itself. See Joas Wagemakers, “A Terrorist Organization that Never Was: The Jordanian ‘Bay‘at al-Imam’ Group,” Middle East Journal 68, no. 1 (2014): 63-4.

[33] Sa‘ud b. Muluh b. Sultan al-‘Anzi, “Al-Bay‘a bayna l-Dawabit al-Shar‘iyya wa-l-Tanzimat al-Hizbiyya,” Al-Asala 8, no. 41 (15 Safar 1424 [18 April 2003]): 34, 36-42; ‘Ali Hasan ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Hamid [al-Halabi], Al-Bay‘a bayna l-Sunna wa-l-Bid‘a ‘inda l-Jama‘at al-Islamiyya (Amman: Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyya, 1985), 9, 24-5.

[34] Several quietist Salafi scholars from Jordan have indicated that they are willing to pledge allegiance to King ‘Abdallah II if asked to do so, for instance. Interviews with Muhammad b. Musa Al Nasr, Amman, June 2012; Basim b. Faysal al-Jawabira, Amman, June 2012.

[35] Al-‘Anzi, “Al-Bay‘a,” 34-6; al-Halabi, Al-Bay‘a, 17-22, 28-30.

[36] Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, Mata Yafqahuna Ma‘na l-Ta‘a? Allahu Akbar: Nusra li-I‘lan Dawlat al-Islam, online at http://justpaste.it/2dmr, published 9 April 2013 (accessed 25 March 2014).

[37] These two words are often used synonymously.

[38] Id., Fusul fi l-Imama wa-l-Bay‘a, online at: http://www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=28121305, published 10 December 2013 (accessed 2 January 2014), 3-13.

[39] Ibid., 8.

[40] Abu Muhammad al-Azdi, Ahwal al-Mu‘aridin li-Dawlat al-Muslimin, online at: http://www.facebook.com/1algharibi/post/624591034258357, n.d. (accessed 26 March 2014), 11-3; Abu Sufyan Turki b. Mubarak al-Bin‘ali, Al-Qiyafa fi ‘adam Ishtirat al-Tamkin al-Kamil li-l-Khilafa, online at http://www.gulfup.com/?Vh0uaJ, published 30 April 2014 (accessed 28 July 2014), 1-3.

[41] Al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 26-8.

[42] Id., Raf‘ al-Malam ‘an Junud Dawlat al-Islam, online at: http://www.gulfup.com/?YilPpd, published 2014 (accessed 28 July 2014)), 3-4, 23.

[43] Id., Fatawa bi-la Tayyar..! online at: http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=345664, published 8 January 2014 (accessed 12 February 2014), 12.

[44] Abu l-Hasan al-Azdi, Mujibat al-Indimam li-l-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi l-‘Iraq wa-l-Sham, online at: http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?519239, published 2013 (26 March 2014), 11-21, 29-30;

[45] ‘Umar b. Mahdi Al Zaydan, Al-Naqd li-Qawl Man Ja‘ala l-Khilafa al-Islamiyya min Din al-Rafd, online at: http://wp.me/p2hUtu-dm, published 2 January 2014 (accessed 12 February 2014), 2.

[46] For more on him, see Cole Bunzel, The Caliphate’s Scholar in Arms, online at: http://www.jihadica.com/the-caliphate%E2%80%99s-scholar-in-arms/, published 9 July 2014 (accessed 28 May 2015).

[47] Abu Humam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari, Madd al-Ayadi li-Bay‘at al-Baghdadi (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=05081301, 2013 (accessed 20 August 2013)), 3-11. See also Joas Wagemakers, Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: The Case for al-Baghdadi, online at: http://www.jihadica.com/al-qaida-advises-the-arab-spring-the-case-for-al-baghdadi/, published 21 September 2013 (accessed 28 May 2015).

[48] Al-Athari, Madd, 15; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 14; id., Raf‘, 7.

[49] Al-Athari, Madd, 15; Bin‘ali, Al-Qiyafa, 4; al-Shinqiti, Raf‘, 7.

[50] Al-Bin‘ali, Al-Qiyafa, 4; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 17; id., Raf‘, 7.

[51] Al-Athari, Madd, 11-2; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 29-33.

[52] Al-Shinqiti, Raf‘, 6-7.

[53] Al-Athari, Madd, 16-7; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 22-5.

[54] Al-Athari, Madd, 17.

[55] ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shinqiti, Al-Khilafa laysat Hiya l-Khilaf, online at: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=16081402, published 10 August 2014 (accessed 18 August 2014), 2-5. See also

[56] Muhammad b. Salih al-Muhajir, Al-Khulasa fi Munaqashat I‘lan al-Khilafa, online at: http://www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=29081402, published 29 August 2014 (accessed 29 August 2014), 2-7.

[57] Bunzel, Paper, 32-4; id., Al-Qaeda’s.

[58] Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, I‘lan al-Khilafa fi l-Mizan al-Shar‘i, online at: http://justpaste.it/kil-mon, published 18 July 2014 (accessed 28 July 2014), 1.

[59] Ibid., 7.

[60] Al-Shinqiti, Raf‘, 6.

[61] Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, Man Huwa Amir al-Mu’minin al-Yawm? Wa-Hal Yajibu Tahqiq Shart al-Qurashiyya fi l-Khalifa? online at: http://www.tawhed.ws/FAQ/pr?qid=5924, published 25 May 2013 (accessed 28 May 2015).

[62] See, for example, Ahmad Bawadi, Izhar al-Hujaj wa-Ibtal Ma fi Maqal al-Shinqiti min Lujaj, online at: http://ahmadbawadi.blogspot.com/2014/07/abawadi_19.html, n.d. (accessed 28 July 2014); Abu Khubab al-‘Iraqi, Tahqiq al-Mizan fi I‘lan Khilafat Dawlat al-Islam, online at: http://www.gulfup.com/?Ln2aG2, published 2014 (accessed 28 July 2014); Abu Salma al-Shinqiti, Al-Maqal al-Tafsili fi l-Tashkik bi-Ma Nasaba li-l-Shaykh Abi l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, online at: http://www.gulfup.com/?S6LN7V, published 21 July 2014 (accessed 24 July 2014).

[63] Abu Maysara al-Shami, Khilafa ‘ala Minhaj al-Nubuwwa am “Khilafa” Qutriyya… , online at: http://platformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?p=297363, n.d. (accessed 28 July 2014).

[64] Id., Radd ‘ala l-Fattan al-Maftun Wara’ al-Kuwalis, online at: http://wp.me/p2hUtu-m3, n.d. (28 July 2014).

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